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Introduction 
 
2006 brings the dawn of a new age- the Left is now enamored by Article I.1 In 
fact legislative acts are now all encompassing, powerful enough to overrule the judicial 
branch, the executive, and even the United States Constitution.  The recent revelations 
concerning National Security Agency surveillance have single-handedly turned the Left 
into a new bastion of legislative zealots.  This article examines through the lens of 
privacy and rights jurisprudence the dogmatic shift of the Left as it doctrinally abandons 
the judicial branch as a forum for policy-making. 
 
Section I analyzes the history of the Left’s attack on undesirable legislation via 
Rights’ arguments.2
Section II analyzes the current controversy over the lawfulness of the National 
Security Agency’s intelligence gathering program involving wiretaps and electronic 
surveillance conducted without Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrant.3
Particularly, Section II analyzes the Constitutionality of the surveillance program under 
the President’s inherent war powers authority granted by Article II of the United States 
Constitution. 
 
Section III concludes the Left’s recent attempts to subordinate the President’s 
Article II war powers constitute not only an attempt to co-opt powers expressly granted to 
the Executive Branch under the U.S. Constitution, but also mark a shift away from the 
legal orthodoxy in which constitutional rights serve to invalidate undesirable state or 
federal legislation.  The article concludes that the Left is doctrinally stumbling into an 
evisceration of its own chief instrument of public policy implementation.  Such 
overreaching will likely have rebounding unintended consequences.         
 
Section I: Spearing Legislation: The Constitution as a Sword 
 
A. Categorizing Radical Individualism 
 
This article examines the history of the Left’s Constitutional jurisprudence as a 
mechanism for political and social change.  It is helpful, first, to accurately describe the 
movement with which this article is concerned.  Principally, “the Left” is not a pejorative.  
 
1 The label “Left” or the Left” is not a pejorative.  See discussion, infra. 
2 “Rights” or “rights” refers to the Bill of Rights through and including the Fourteenth Amendment. 
3 The National Security Agency (NSA) program was disclosed by a New York Times article which 
reported that President Bush had authorized the NSA to monitor the international telephone calls and 
emails of U.S. citizens and residents without court-approved warrants.  See, Dan Eggen, “Justice Dept. 
Investigating Leak of NSA Wiretapping,” WASHINGTON POST, December 31, 2005, at A01. 
2Likewise, this author does not presume to corral all persons who may share elements of 
particular theories and ideologies in a broadly defined class.4
The Left as used herein describes the political/legal intellectual class devoted to radical 
individualism and radical egalitarianism, and dedicated to imposition of those 
philosophies through the courts.5 Such thinking is exemplified by the American Civil 
Liberties Union, an organization whose myopic doctrine of the maximization of 
individual rights through the judicial process is limited only by its twin devotion to group 
equality.6
B.  Understanding the Constitutional Framework of Shared and Exclusive 
Powers. 
A brief history lesson is appropriate in understanding the remarkable revolution 
now sweeping the Left like a wildfire.  The United States Constitution was at is founding 
and is today, a magnificent political system: a doctrine of balanced powers among 
branches and shared between the national and state governments.7 Simply, Article I 
established the Congress, Article II the presidency, Article III produced the judicial 
branch, and so forth.8 Recognizing the conflicts implicit in a federal republic, the 
Founders made the national government one of limited and exclusive powers.9
4 The author does not define the Left to include, e.g., all liberals, or all Democrats, or all of any other group 
which may share ideological agreement with the Left as defined in the discussion herein. Further, the 
author is amusedly cautious of the Supreme Court’s conclusion that all classifications erected around 
politically unpopular groups are unlawful and evil.  See, discussion of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996), infra. 
5 See, Robert H. Bork, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH, at p. 96 (1996).   
6 Ibid. at p. 97.  Bork argues that the ACLU’S brand of radical individualism which advocates, inter alia,
that nude dancing is protected free speech or that metal detectors in airports are an unlawful intrusion upon 
private autonomy is internally discordant in that the organization favors more and substantial limits on 
individual choices in areas such as affirmative action or employer’s rights.  Id. at 97-98.  The dichotomy of 
favoring individual choice while rejecting electoral choice is explored more thoroughly by evaluating the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Romer v. Evans, and Lawrence v. Texas in particular, infra.    
7 See, James Madison, FEDERALIST NO. 39.    In Federalist No. 39, Madison extolled the virtues of the 
Constitution’s framework: republican government neither wholly national in form nor wholly federal, a 
framework equally deriving its authority from the consent of the majority and the confederation of states.  
8 See, US CONST., ART I, §1[establishing Congress with all legislative powers], US CONST., ART II, 
§1[vesting executive powers in the President of the United States], US CONST., ART III, §1[The judicial 
power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts…], U.S. 
Const., amend X [The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”]. 
9 James Madison, FEDERALIST NO. 39, “In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be 
deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to 
the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in 
controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to 
decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the 
case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and 
most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to 
prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under 
the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely 
established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.” 
3The Founders recognized that a system of co-equal states, while permitting 
multiple experiments in self government, would require some national identity and 
authority.10 Thus was borne a system in which the national government retained 
exclusive authority over select issues of a national character, among others: national 
defense,11 interstate commerce,12 immigration,13 a national bank.14 The wisdom of this 
approach is beyond controversy.  Would the nation prefer to still have Confederate 
dollars or perhaps New Hampshire doubloons?  Would it be desirable for a heavily 
immigrated state such as California,15 or for Canadian- borne Michigan Governor 
Jennifer Granholm16 to be vested with the power to regulate immigration and citizenship?  
The Constitution’s foresight was genius.  For its time, unheralded genius, but genius still 
today. 
Article I vested law and policymaking in the Congress, a model followed in each 
state.17 Made up of elected members of the several states the Congress was intended to 
reflect the people.18 The Left has never liked “populist” realism and so has sought to use 
 
10 Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 6 recognized not only the dangers to the Union from foreign states, 
but also poignantly recognized,”A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt 
that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the 
subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To 
presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence, would be to forget that 
men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of 
independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform 
course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.”  Alexander Hamilton, 
FEDERALIST NO. 6.  See also, Alexander Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 9, “A FIRM Union will be of 
the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and 
insurrection.” 
11 US CONST., ART II, §2[President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the militia of the several states…] 
12 US CONST., ART I, §8. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See, Jeffrey S. Passel and Wendy Zimmerman, “Are Immigrants Leaving California,” April 1, 2001 at 
http://www.urban.org/publications/410287.html . Passel and Zimmerman in an Urban Institute Study find 
that California leads the nation in immigrants. 
16 Michigan Governor Granholm was born in Vancouver, British Columbia.  See, 
http://www.michigan.gov/gov/0,1607,7-168--57920--,00.html
17 See e.g., CAL. CONST. ART. IV, §1 (California), N.Y. CONST., Art. III, §1 (New York), MA CONST., 
Part the Second, Art. Ch. 1, §1, Art. I. (Massachusetts), FL CONST., Art. III, §1 (Florida).  NE CONST., 
Art. III, §CIII-1 (Nebraska).  Although Nebraska’s revised Constitution created only a unicameral 
legislature, thus rejecting the two house framework of the United States and each of the other States, its 
Constitution clearly vests the legislative power in that sole Legislative body.  NE CONST., Art. III, §CIII-
1.     
18 As Hamilton and/or Madison noted in Federalist No. 52, the most basic structures of the House of 
Representatives were intended to reflect the people.  Most pointedly these concerns were reflected in the 
qualifications to be elected and the frequency and term of elections.  FEDERALIST NO. 52.  Hamilton and 
Madison echoed this sentiment when they wrote “The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a 
meeting of the citizens in person…”  Id. 
 
4judicial fiat to accomplish what it could not in state houses or ballot boxes.19 In each 
instance, the Left has insisted that Constitutional imperatives, nearly  always implicit, 
must invalidate undesirable [in their perspective] legislation. 
 
C.  Griswold Forward: The Constitutional Sword of Legislating Privacy Rights 
trough the Courts.20 
The state of Connecticut circa 1958 through its popularly chosen representatives 
enacted a law banning the use of contraceptives.21 The executive director and medical 
director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut challenged the law after their 
arrest under the statute.22 Following a tortured construction of the 14th Amendment and 
the Bill of Rights, an implicit right to contraception emanated from the penumbras of the 
Bill of Rights to invalidate the law.23 State legislative acts must yield to the 14th 
Amendment, the Court held, where the two contradict.24 Griswold was notable in that the 
Court created the constitutional conflict- the clash between marital privacy rights and the 
Connecticut statute was judicially manufactured in that no such marital right to 
contraception appears in the Constitution, and no married couple invoking said rights was 
a party to the case.25 Griswold, in fact, inaugurated the beginning of the Left’s strategy 
and preference for judicial policymaking.26 
In 1992 the people of Colorado enacted Constitutional Amendment 2 by statewide 
referendum, repealing all Colorado local ordinances to the extent they prohibited 
 
19 As more fully developed in Section I, infra, the case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) is 
illuminative.  The Connecticut statute at issue was, in hindsight, likely quite silly.  However, neither 
legislative silliness, nor legislative imprudence requires judicial correction.  California, for example, 
criminalizes the act of battery disposal in ordinary trash.  22 Cal. Code Reg. 66273.2.  Absent the crazed 
lawbreaker who launches a used battery through a police station window, the California law’s inherent 
unenforceability makes it uncommonly silly.  cf., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 528 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).   The citizens and legislators of California and Connecticut are and were more than capable of 
revising or eliminating these statutes through the legislative process.  The single-minded focus on judicial 
policy-making, thus, appears hostile to legislative democracy.       
20 One might contend that the using the Constitution as a sword to invalidate state actions is structurally 
incongruent with the Constitution and Bill of Rights.  The Bill of Rights in particular, is more aptly a 
shield- a set of limits or protections from specific state actions.  
21 Conn. Gen. Stat. §53-32 (1958 rev.) 
22 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 482.  Justice Douglas’ majority opinion noted that the Supreme Court does not “sit as a super-
legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business 
affairs, or social conditions.”  The Court then invalidated the Connecticut statute based upon the privacy 
rights of married couples, notwithstanding that the appellants were not a married couple prosecuted under 
the statute.  It is precisely the Court’s bootstrapping of privacy rights which inure to married couples to 
invalidate the statute which evidences the Court was indeed sitting as a super-legislature.    
25 The Court’s reasoning is both unremarkable and extraordinary.  The opinion is unremarkable in that the 
14th Amendment clearly invalidates any state law conflicting with a Constitutional right.  See, Loving, v. 
Virginia, Brown v. Board of Education, Casey v. Planned Parenthood, infra.  Justice Douglas’ opinion is 
remarkable in that it created the right [to contraception] used to invalidate the Connecticut law.       
26 The Court would later concede that Griswold marked the most pertinent beginning point in its path of 
using  substantive due process to invalidate state statutes.  See, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 528 (2003).  
5discrimination based on homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation.27 The Supreme 
Court struck down the statute on Equal Protection Clause grounds, holding that the 
Amendment failed to meet even the rational basis test.28 
Several things are illuminative about the Romer Court’s reasoning.  First, the case 
was a facial challenge to the entire Amendment.29 Second, unlike the petitioners in 
Griswold, the parties lacked actual standing- none had sustained an injury in fact alleged 
to have been caused by the amendment.30 Third, the Court appraised the conduct of the 
voters of Colorado and determined it to be pernicious.31 As the Court noted: 
 
“’If the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means 
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare… desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.’”32 
These three facts in particular weigh strongly in favor of the Court acting as a 
super-legislature.  Most notably, the combination of allowing plaintiffs with arguable 
standing to facially challenge the entire Amendment evidences that not only the bringing 
of the suit, but the Court’s invalidation of the Amendment was an act of political 
preference, not legal judgment.   
 
Also illustrative is the sweep of the Court’s unilateral assessment of the motives 
of the Colorado electorate.  The Court’s opinion concludes its inquiry: “We must 
conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end 
but to make them unequal to everyone else…A State cannot so deem a class of persons a 
 
27 Colo. Const., Art. II, §30b, see also, Romer v. Evans, 517 US 620 (1996).  Amendment 2 not only 
repealed existing ordinances pertaining to protections from discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, the Amendment likewise foreclosed further legislative action to create such protections.  Id. 
28 Id. at 633.  The Court summarized the rational basis test thusly: “The search for the link between 
classification and objective gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause.  It provides guidance and 
discipline for the legislature, which is entitled to know what sorts of laws it can pass; and it marks the limit 
of our own authority.  In the ordinary case a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate 
government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if 
the rationale for it seems tenuous.” Id.  (citations omitted).   
29 Id. at 641 (opinion of Scalia J., dissenting). 
30 The case was filed seeking injunctive relief to enjoin the amendment’s enforcement. Id. at 625.  Among 
the plaintiffs were government entities that had enacted laws which would be invalidated by Amendment 2, 
and homosexual persons who alleged that enforcement would subject them to immediate and substantial 
risk of discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation.  Id.  The municipal entities arguably had a 
greater standing claim as the Amendment’s language immediately invalidated the ordinances passed by 
those locales to prohibit discrimination based upon sexual orientation.  The individual plaintiffs, however, 
possessed only a, in the Court’s words, risk of discrimination.  Id.  It is difficult to conceive of a human 
being with any characteristics (i.e., a person with an identifiable age, gender, nationality, religion) who 
might not likewise be under a theoretical  immediate risk of discrimination based upon those traits.     
31 Amendment 2 was enacted by popular referendum, not through the Legislature.  The Court thus 
undertook a puzzling inquiry of motive, ultimately concluding that the majority of voters were motivated 
by animus.    
32 Id. at 633 (citing, Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
6stranger to its laws.”33 The Court’s own reasoning evidenced that the sole question was 
whether a class of homosexuals may be singled out for disfavored treatment?  Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion made clear that under the equal Protection Clause, a 
homosexual class could not be disfavored.34 
Having recognized the penultimate question that Amendment 2 posed the then-
unique question of the proper legal status or preference which may be afforded a class of 
homosexuals, the Court’s opinion is laid bare as a political act- a rejection of a political 
opinion [that homosexuals as a class are not entitled to preference in non-discrimination 
laws].35 Further, the mere fact that the Amendment 2 received a 46% “No” vote signifies 
that it was a very closely waged political battle.36 Moreover, as the three dissenting 
justices noted, a homosexual population of roughly 4% which garnered 46% of the 
overall vote does not suggest a politically unpopular group singled out for disfavored 
treatment.37 Rather, it reflected an ongoing political dialogue in which one side lost one 
election.  The political power of homosexuals has been borne out by other electoral 
gains.38 
Justice Scalia’s Romer dissent, among other scholarship, makes fair arguments 
that the Romer majority’s opinion is irreconcilable with the Court’s prior decisions 
upholding, for example, bans on polygamy or statutory forfeiture of voting rights by 
felons and polygamists.39 Those particular arguments and comparisons however 
provocative or substantial in their own right, are uninteresting to the primary question of 
whether the trend towards preferential judicial policymaking has terminated with the 
present National Security Agency wiretapping drama.         
 
33 Id. at 637. 
34 See fn. 23, supra. 
35 In 1996 when Romer was decided, the Court’s Bowers v. Hardwick opinion [no due process right to 
homosexual sodomy] was still considered good law as Lawrence v. Texas, see discussion infra, had not yet 
been handed down, and the same-sex marriage “rebellion” sparked in Massachusetts and San Francisco, 
among others, had not yet been sparked.  Romer was a thus “unique for its time” analysis of homosexual 
class rights.  Likewise, the Canadian Supreme Court had not yet judicially compelled same-sex marriage as 
it did in 2003 in Halpern v. Toronto, 2003 WL 34950 (Ontario Ct. App.).  See also, Lawrence v. Texas,
supra 539 U.S. at 589(Scalia, J., dissenting).       
36 Romer, supra at 653 (Scalia, J. dissenting).   
37 Id. 
38 Id at 645 (Scalia, J. dissenting), see also Louise Chu, “San Francisco voters approve 
handgun, military recruiting bans,” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Nov. 9, 2005.  Voters 
in the City and County of San Francisco overwhelmingly approved Measure I, banning 
military recruiters from public schools and colleges.  Whether the ban was directed at the 
military’s policy on homosexuals, as is the university community’s challenge to the 
federal Solomon Amendment, or was instead a symbolic repudiation of the Iraq War is in 
question, but he gay rights’ issues likely played a role.  See also, Stanley Kurtz, “San 
Francisco to Army: Drop Dead. The perils of the counter recruitment movement,” THE WEEKLY 
STANDARD, Volume 011, Issue 11 , Nov. 28, 2005 (discussing Measure I and the court challenge to the 
Solomon Amendment). 
39 Romer, supra, at 650 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
7The State of Texas enacted a law prohibiting homosexual sodomy.40 Two 
individuals convicted under the law challenged its constitutionality.41 The Court 
utilized the substantive due process rational basis test, as it did in Romer, to invalidate the 
law again holding that the majority may not use the power of the State to enforce ethical 
or moral principles.42 
The question arises as to whether Lawrence is an example of judicial 
policymaking?  On the one hand, the case was a Constitutional challenge arising from the 
criminal conviction of Lawrence and his co-defendant.  These petitioners clearly had 
standing and a right to seek redress through the courts.  However, several factors betray 
the opinion as judicial activism dismissive of pluralistic democratic process.  First, the 
Court rejected stare decisis and overruled an on-point opinion only 17 years old.43 
Notably, the Court did not use a novel theory to circumvent its earlier holding in Bowers 
v. Hardwick in reaching its decision in Lawrence. It did not, for example, adopt an Equal 
Protection Clause analysis to avoid contradicting its earlier substantive Due Process 
Clause analysis in Bowers. Instead, the Court simply revisited its earlier ruling and 
overruled it.  Second, the Court’s failure to apply its own recent precedent is itself 
troubling.  The mere overruling of precedent is not in itself proof of judicial 
policymaking.  However, in light of the fact that the Lawrence majority relied heavily on 
its earlier opinion in Casey, to support its conclusion, the judicial policymaking 
determination is perfunctory.44 The Court used Casey and its predecessor opinion in Roe 
v. Wade to establish the due process liberty interest which protects the right to private 
[homo] sexual conduct.45 The Court then overlooked, deliberately it seems, that Casey’s 
rationale rested on stare decisis grounds.46 The Court, thus, used stare decisis to uphold 
the identical substantive due process right [to privacy] in Casey which it upheld in 
Lawrence by rejecting the same principle of stare decisis.47 
Third, in settling an ongoing debate in the culture war, the Lawrence Court relied 
heavily on both the arguments and evidence submitted by the American Civil Liberties 
Union and on foreign law.48 The need to circumvent American constitutional law begs 
 
40 Tex. Penal Code Ann. §21.06(a) (2003), see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 528 (2003).  This Author 
agrees with Justice Thomas who noted the Texas law was “uncommonly silly.”  Id. at 604 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
41 Lawrence v. Texas, supra, at 563.   
42 Id. at 574 (citing, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).  
Concededly, the Lawrence Court phrased its inquiry as a question (May the majority use the power of the 
State to enforce ethical or moral principles…?) whereas this author paraphrased the Court’s inquiry as a 
statement.  However, that the court invalidated the statute on a mere rational basis inquiry [holding that the 
statute did not have any legitimate governmental interest] provides a concrete basis on which to determine 
the Court did in fact conclude that neither a State nor its people may enforce laws predicated upon social 
mores or principles.     
43 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
44 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa v. Casey, supra, fn. 33. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 844-46, 854-869. 
47 Whether there existed grounds on which to distinguish Casey from Lawrence on the stare decisis issue is 
immaterial.  The Court’ failure to even address the stare decisis issue is proof enough that the court reached 
a desired policy result, and then bootstrapped an analysis.  
48 See Lawrence, supra, 539 U.S. at 574-578.  As Justice Scalia wrote in his Romer dissent, the issue of 
how society is to treat homosexuals (whether opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as race or 
8the question of whether the Court’s opinion was in fact based on Constitutional 
jurisprudence or was simply a desired policy justified by any support the Court could 
locate. 
 Fourth, the Court’s own opaque reasoning in overruling Bowers, but not
explicitly barring morals-based laws suggests tortured, results-oriented reasoning.49 By 
concluding that the Court’s duty was to define the liberty of all, not to mandate its own 
moral code, the Court undertook the contrary.  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
both reasoning and result, firmly rejects morality or the desire to preserve traditional 
mores as a sufficient justification for class-wide treatment of homosexuals.50 Rejecting 
tradition, or preservation of societal mores as a legitimate governmental interest would 
have sufficed as at least a consistent substantive due process clause analysis.51 The 
Court, however, immediately dismembered its own calculus. 
Whether one agreed with the Court’s due process analysis or not, the analysis 
could be justified as a reasonable extension of both the Court’s liberty analysis in Casey 
and its appraisal of classwide disfavored treatment of homosexuals in Romer.52 
Inexplicably, the Court immediately truncated its analysis by stating that its opinion did 
not implicate “whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”53 
The Court’s statement is clearly designed to limit criticism that its decision in 
Lawrence would mandate  same-sex marriage.  This is troubling and illustrative of the 
dangers of judicial policymaking for several reasons.  At a basic justiciability level, the 
Court’s statement that Lawrence would not compel recognition of same-sex marriage, an 
issue not before it, appears to lightly tread the chasm between dicta and an impermissible 
advisory opinion.54 
Next, the Court’s self-indulgent foray into same-sex marriage illustrates that it 
was again cognizant of its intrusion into a cultural debate whose remedy lies in 
 
religious bias) is precisely the cultural debate that gave rise to Amendment 2 in Colorado.  See, Romer,
supra, at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Where the Constitution says nothing about this subject, it is left to be 
resolved by normal democratic means.  Id.  Emphatically, the Court has no business deciding for the rest of 
the country that disapproval or animosity toward homosexuals is evil.  Id.   
49 Specifically, the Court overruled the Bowers Court’s conclusion that a State’s interest in promoting social 
mores or traditions could not justify the statute’s invasion of the petitioner’s liberty interest under 
substantive due process analysis.  The Court stated the “issue is whether the majority may use the power of 
the State to enforce these [social] views.”  Lawrence, supra, 539 U.S. at 570.      
50 Id. (citing, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).).  Justice Stevens’ dissent in 
Bowers, adopted by the Lawrence majority, likening sodomy laws to miscegenation prohibitions, 
concluded that neither tradition nor history could justify a law infringing upon a liberty interest.  Id.  
51 The Court concluded in Romer that singling out a class of homosexuals for disfavored treatment 
amounted to bias and a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.  Such animus could not constitute 
a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause.  Lawrence therefore could be seen as 
a reasonable extension of the Romer equal protection analysis to substantive due process analysis.       
52 See footnote 51, supra. 
53 Lawrence, supra, at 578. 
54 Federal courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions.  Article III requires that a federal court may 
not issue opinions except in a case or controversy.  See, US CONST. Art III, §2, see also, 13 Wright & 
Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Section 3529.1 (1984) at p.298 
9democratic procedures. 55 Most importantly, the Court’s desire to limit its own opinion is 
a guilty “hand caught in the cookie jar” admission. 
 
The Court clearly apprehended that its substantive due process analysis 
would naturally encompass a subsequent claim that an individual’s liberty interest 
protected the right to same-sex marriage.  The Court’s eagerness to distance itself from 
its own analysis betrays its recognition, and rejection of, the reasoning employed to 
justify a preferred policy result.  Nowhere in its other jurisprudence has the Supreme 
Court gone to such pains to self-limit its own reasoning.  The Court did not, for example, 
in striking down Virginia’s miscegenation law on Equal Protection grounds mutilate its 
own reasoning.56 In striking down the Virginia law banning interracial marriage the Court 
reasoned "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry" are "odious to 
a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."57 
The Loving Court’s reasoning was so unassailable that its command needed no 
self limit.  One could hardly imagine Chief Justice Warren writing,  
 
“We hold the Virginia statute to be unconstitutional as an unlawful racial 
classification and illegitimate violation of the liberty interest and right to 
marry, but we do not mean to state by this opinion that individuals may 
marry chipmunks or that necrophilia must be recognized by the State.”   
 
Instead, the Court interpreted the law at issue in the context of both the Constitution’s 
text and prior case law.  Such is the business of judging.  The Loving Court did not hurry 
to qualify its analysis though some of its language might easily compel the requirement 
of same-sex marriage or polygamy.58 
The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses alone have not formed the sole 
basis of attack of the Left’s assault on democratic legislation.  A majority of the death 
penalty states in the U.S. in 2005 permitted capital punishment for minors.59 Seventeen 
year old Christopher Simmons was convicted of murder and sentenced to death under 
Missouri’s death penalty statute.60 Simmons challenged his sentence under the 8th 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, notwithstanding that the 
Supreme Court had held only fifteen years earlier that capital punishment was 
constitutional as applied to seventeen year old’s.61 
55 See fn. 48, supra. 
56 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
57 Id. at 10 (citing, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).).  The Court further stated, “To 
deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these 
statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law.”  Id. 
58 The Loving Court wrote “Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to our very 
existence and survival. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 
190 (1888).”  Id.  The Court’s reasoning could easily compel a substantive due process right to polygamy 
or same-sex marriage. 
59 See, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 609 (2005)(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
60 Id. at 556, 558. 
61 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) 
10
Justice Kennedy again writing for the Court held the Missouri statute 
unconstitutional as applied to minors on grounds that it violated the 8th Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.62 The Court invalidated the Missouri law, 
reasoning that evolving standards of decency had demonstrated a national consensus that 
the juvenile death penalty was cruel and unusual.63 Several features of the Court’s 
opinion evidence the use of the 8th Amendment to dispatch legislation beyond the Left’s 
democratic reach. 
 
First, the Court rejected, as it did in Lawrence, its own recent precedent.64 Worse, 
the Court did not reject its own reasoning in Stanford v. Kentucky on the grounds that it 
was decided wrongly, but instead reasoned that the Constitution’s definition of cruel and 
unusual had changed in the span of fifteen years.65 The mere reversal of precedent does 
not necessarily imply a political rather than a judicial act, however, it is noteworthy that 
the stare decisis reasoning used to prolong Roe’s vitality in Casey was then supported by 
Justice Kennedy, but cast away in Roper.66 
Second, the Court engaged in what can only be called mathematic 
gymnastics to create a “national consensus” that the death penalty as applied to minors 
was cruel and unusual.  Earlier in Stanford the Court had opined that whether a national 
consensus exists should be determined by reference to state statutes.67 Justice Scalia’s 
Roper dissent recognized the Court found a national consensus against the juvenile death 
penalty because 18 states barred juvenile capital punishment.68 As Justice Scalia so aptly 
stated, “Words have no meaning if the views of less than 50% of the death penalty States 
can constitute a national consensus.”69 
Third, is the abundant democratic hostility of the Court’s reasoning.  By devising 
an analysis which ignored precedent and looted the definition of “consensus” by defining 
it to include less than a simple majority, the Court clearly toiled to reach a result its 
earlier Stanford reasoning would not embrace.70 Importantly, by declaring the juvenile 
death penalty to be per se unconstitutional the Court forever removed the debate of the 
policy’s propriety from the people or their elected representatives.71 Indeed, those 18 
States lauded by the Court as a national consensus are now forever foreclosed from 
 
62 Roper, supra, at 565-57. 
63 Id. 
64 See, Stanford v. Kentucky, supra. 
65 Roper v. Simmons, supra at 608 (2005)(Scalia, J., dissenting).  
66 Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s plurality opinion in Casey. See, Casey, supra. 
67 Stanford v. Kentucky, supra, 492 U.S. at 370.   
68 See, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  18 states represented 47% of the states 
permitting capital punishment.  Id. 
69 Id. 
70 A “consensus” is “An opinion or position reached by a group as a whole.  AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, (4th ed. 2000).  Semantically, even a simple majority might not 
constitute a consensus, but the Court’s suggestion that a minority of states could constitute a consensus is 
verbal pillory. 
71 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
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reconsidering their policies.72 It is an open question whether legislators in those states 
would have voted for the bans were they aware that their vote would be sealed in bedrock 
for all eternity by the Court, or had they been advised their vote on what may very well 
have been a public policy experiment, might be used to decide the same issue in every 
other State in the Union.73 Indeed, a more provocative question might be the impact of 
other state policy experiments in euthanasia, medical marijuana, or mandatory health 
insurance?74 The fifty state laboratories are likely imperiled by the Court’s broad swath. 
 
As the Supreme Court noted twenty years ago in another death penalty case, “In a 
democratic society legislature, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and 
consequently the moral values of the people.”75 The Roper opinion is thus evidenced as 
judicial hostage taking of what are properly questions for the people and their 
legislatures.  Justice Scalia noted this in his Roper dissent, pointing out, “By what 
conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the 
Nation.”76 
Fourth, is the Court’s reference to foreign law and the advocacy of certain Left-
oriented groups.77 Again the contrast between Casey and Roper is instructive.  The 
American Psychiatric Association’s amicus brief played a role in the Court’s conclusion 
that juveniles lack the cognitive development to appreciate their actions when embarking 
on a capital crime.78 However, fifteen years earlier the American Psychiatric Association 
opined in Hodgson v. Minnesota, that juveniles were mature enough to decide whether to 
obtain an abortion.79 Ignoring its own precedent the Roper Court simply “look[ed] over 
the heads of the crowd and picked out its friends.”80 
Section II: The War on the War Powers 
 
And so now the Left comes to the NSA’S “domestic wiretapping.”81 Specific 
details of the covert program are scant, but the general thrust of the program appears to 
be that beginning in early 2002 the NSA began monitoring telephone numbers and email 
addresses discovered in the computers, cell phones, and address books of captured Al 
 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 See, Gonzales v. Oregon, ____ U.S. ___slip op. (2006)(Oregon euthanasia law), Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. ___ slip op. (2005)(California medical marijuana law), Frances Burns, “Romney wants compulsory 
health insurance,” WASHINGTON TIMES, Jun. 21,2005 (Massachusetts debates requiring all residents to 
purchase health insurance). 
75 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1976). 
76 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
77 The Court relied heavily on European and international law.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 567. 
78 Id. at 569. 
79 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 617-18 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).   
80 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 617(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).   
81 See e.g., , Dan Eggen, “Justice Dept. Investigating Leak of NSA Wiretapping,” WASHINGTON POST,
December 31, 2005, at A01, David Tell, “The Worst of Times,” THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Vol. 011, Issue 
17, Jan. 1, 2006. 
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Qaeda operatives.82 The surveillance program is focused primarily (71)%) on foreign 
targets, but has included the monitoring of communications with persons in the United 
States.83 
The Administration’s warrantless surveillance of calls between some US citizens 
and members of Al Qaeda is lawlessness run amok, exalts a reinvigorated and excited 
Left.  The President may be impeached for this, warns Democratic Senator Barbara 
Boxer – a model of Leftist dialogue and theory- because he has admitted he did not 
follow the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”).84 The charge may have 
factual merit, but as discussed, infra, is legally askew.   
 
FISA governs electronic surveillance for “foreign intelligence information .“85 
FISA states a President may get judicial approval from a FISA court to obtain foreign 
intelligence information.86 FISA permits the Executive Branch to seek a warrant to 
conduct surveillance before or 72 hours after conducting a search or surveillance in 
foreign intelligence cases.87 The Bush administration has offered two principal 
justifications for the NSA program: 1) the Congressional Authorization for Use of 
Military Force passed after the September 11th attacks and; 2) Constitutional authority.88 
While the former almost certainly justifies the NSA program, this article concerns only 
the Constitutional Article II justification.89 Article II, Section 2 of the United States 
Constitution states, 
 
82 See, Tell, Ibid. 
83 Ibid.  Of the 7,000 contacts monitored by the NSA program, approximately 500 were located in the 
United States. 
84 See e.g., Ben Johnson, “Impeaching ‘Big Brother’,” FRONT PAGE MAGAZINE, Dec. 21, 2005, at 
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=20635., see also, blog of Congressman John 
Conyers at http://www.conyersblog.us/ (arguing the NSA program is unlawful), David Jackson, “Gore: 
Domestic spying goes beyond Bush's authority,” USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 2006 (Gore does not call for 
impeachment as other Democrats have done), ABSNEWS.com, Jan. 17, 2006 at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/TheNote/story?id=1513546 (former Vice President did not go as far as 
some Democrats who have called for the President's impeachment). 
85 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act at 50 U.S.C. 1802. 
86 50 U.S.C 1805 (a)(3), see also, In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 722 (U.S. Foreign Surveillance Ct. of 
R.  2002).  
87 50 U.S.C. 1805, 50 U.S.C. 1805(f) (emergency orders). 
88 Associated Press, “Gonzales Defends NSA Wiretapping Program, Jan. 24, 2006 at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,182652,00.html
89 The Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), held that the Congressional 
Authorization for Use of Military Force authorized the President to conduct military detentions of 
individuals.  Id. at  517; see also  Congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force.  115 Stat. 224.  
Other scholars have opined that the AUMF provides justification for the NSA program.  See, Cass R. 
Sunstein, “Presidential Wiretapping: Disaggregating the Issues,” Dec. 20, 2005 at 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2005/12/presidential_wi_1.html. Professor Sunstein notes that if 
surveillance is taken to be an ordinary incident of war the argument that FISA controls the AUMF is 
substantially weakened.  Sunstein also notes the cases do not clearly support the view that when monitoring 
(a) an international call involving (b) someone with an Al Qaeda connection (c) to or from the United 
States, the President must, (d) under post-9/11 conditions, obtain a warrant. 
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“The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service 
of the United States.”90 
The Left maintains that the NSA program violates the FISA warrant requirement 
and is, hence, unlawful.  What arises is a fundamental contradiction between an explicit 
article of the Constitution and a federal statute.91 It is an elemental inquiry into whether 
Congress can act as a check on the Executive’s war powers going to the basic principles 
of the Constitutional structure.92 
As a threshold question, this inquiry demands a determination of whether the 
United States is in fact at war such that the Executive’s Article II war powers are 
invoked?  The absence of a formal Congressional declaration of war in this instance is 
unpersuasive.  Likely dispositive is the Authorization for Use of Military Force which 
declared the President may use “all necessary and appropriate force” against nations, 
organizations, and persons associated with the September 11th attacks.93 The 
Congressional Authorization clearly intended and authorized use of the American 
military forces.  As Commander in Chief of those forces the President’s war powers are 
necessarily implicated.94 The Supreme Court confirmed this when it reasoned that 
“There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States in 
Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the Al 
Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to 
target in passing the AUMF.95 The NSA program is directed at Al Qaeda and its 
members and supporters.96 Thus, the President’s Article II war powers are involved.  
 
That the War on Terror crosses transnational boundaries including the borders of 
the United States, or that it implicates citizens of numerous nations including this 
Nation’s, only serves to heighten the Constitutional powers delegated to the Executive, 
not to diminish them.  As Alexander Hamilton famously wrote in Federalist No. 74, 
 
“Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most 
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power 
by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common 
strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength, 
forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive 
authority.”97 
90 U.S. CONST., ART. II, § 2. 
91 One should note that Article II is an explicit clause of the Constitution.  For decades the Left has used 
implicit rights, e.g., in Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence,  to invalidate Congressional and state legislative acts. 
92 cf., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra, 542 U.S. at 580. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
93 115 Stat. 224 
94 U.S. CONST., ART. II, §2: “The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United 
States…” 
95 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra, 542 U.S. at 518. 
96 See, Tell, supra, at fn. 81. 
97 FEDERALIST NO. 74, see also, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra, 542 U.S. at 581. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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The Supreme Court has long paid heed to Article II’s plenary grant of power to 
the Executive branch in its exclusive delegations.98 In addressing the President’s foreign 
affairs’ powers in 1936 the Court reasoned the President “has his confidential sources of 
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. 
Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the 
premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.”99 
As Justice Thomas recognized in his Hamdi dissent, judicial interference in the foreign 
affairs domain destroys the purpose of vesting primary responsibility in a unitary 
Executive.100 
The FISA law itself contains a check in that a FISA warrant requires a 
certification from a national security officer.101 Nonetheless, some on the Left have 
charged that the Administration’s interpretation of Executive power leads to an 
unchecked presidency.102 The Founders considered and rejected such a contention.  The 
Constitution provides a check to the Executive’s power over the military by vesting in the 
Legislative Branch the sole authority to raise armies, and to declare war.103 But that the 
Constitution vests the war making authority in the President seems beyond dispute.104 
Thus, the Constitution’s own internal framework checks Presidential power while at the 
same time energizing the Executive.  Congress likely has many checks on the program 
including defunding the program or the NSA entirely, but rewriting the President’s 
Article II war powers is not one of those options. 
 
Nor is the uniqueness of this war a substantive charge.  That the war on terror 
might last for years, decades, or even generations does not lessen the Constitutional 
gravamen set forth in Article II, Section 2.  National security surveillance by its very 
nature differs from criminal justice surveillance and is often long range and interrelates 
various sources and types of information.105 That it might embrace technologies never 
contemplated by the Founders, or be fought among bits, bytes, and radio waves does not 
diminish the wisdom of Article II’s delegation to the Executive.  As Hamilton wrote in 
1787, 
 
98 Article II, Section 2 delegates to the Executive command of “…the Army and Navy of the United States, 
and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States…” Section 2 
also delegates to the President that “He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls…”   
99 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
100 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra, 542 U.S. at 580. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
101 In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 739  
102 Jane Harmen, “Checks and balances, interrupted” San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 5, 2006.  
Congresswoman Harmen went so far as to suggest President Bush was a tyrant on par with Saddam 
Hussein.  Such ad hominem invective lacking any basis in the Constitution does not suffice for legal 
argument nor even effective advocacy.  It does, however, typify the Left’s assault on the Constitution.   
103 U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, see also, Alexander Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 23. 
104 U.S. CONST., ART. II, § 2. 
105 In re: Sealed Case, supra, 310 F.3d at 740. 
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“The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for 
this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power 
to which the care of it is committed.”106 
The very issue posed by the NSA Program is nothing less than the authority of the 
President to conduct war.  The Supreme Court has long recognized the President has 
constitutional authority to protect the national security and that such authority carries 
broad discretion.107 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review sidestepped this critical 
issue in 2002.108 In In re: Sealed Case the FISA Court of Review rejected restrictions in 
a foreign surveillance warrant placed on the government by a FISA judge based on both 
statutory and constitutional grounds.109 In that case, the trial court granted a Justice 
Department application for a FISA court order, but further required that certain other 
restrictions be met, including that the Department’s “law enforcement officials shall not 
make recommendations to intelligence officials concerning the initiation, operation, 
continuation or expansion of FISA searches or surveillances.”110 This was the now-
famous “wall” between intelligence gathering and criminal investigations referred to at 
length in the 911 hearings, and Congressional debates over the Patriot Act.111 
The FISA Court of Review invalidated the restrictions placed on the warrant on 
several grounds, the consideration of which illuminate the Constitutional question at issue 
here.  Most importantly, the Court of Review reversed the lower court’s restrictions on 
the grounds that the court’s order unconstitutionally usurped the Executive Branch’s 
powers.112 Specifically, the court concluded that the lower court’s order impermissibly 
interfered with the Attorney General’s Article II authority to determine how to deploy 
personnel resources.113 The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s language in Morrison v. 
Olson wherein the Supreme Court cautioned the D.C. Circuit to avoid administrative 
guidance to the Independent Counsel as actions having “serious constitutional 
ramifications.”114 
Thus, the Court of Review recognized specifically in the FISA warrant context that the 
FISA warrant process can, and in that case did, tread dangerously close to Constitutional 
separation of powers issues. 
 
The Court of Review’s rejection of the lower court’s restrictions [on the court 
order approving surveillance] was ultimately based on a statutory analysis of FISA and a 
finding that FISA amplified the President’s power by providing a mechanism that at least 
 
106 Alexander Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 23. 
107 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra, 542 U.S. at 581. (Thomas, J., dissenting)(citing, Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, 
668,670 (1863).). 
108 See, In re: Sealed Case, supra at footnote 86. 
109 In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719-20. 
110 Id. at 720. 
111 Id. at 728-733, 743 
112 Id. at 731. 
113 Id. (citing, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).). 
114 Id. at 731-32. 
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approaches a classic warrant and which therefore supported a conclusion that the FISA 
searches were constitutionally reasonable.115 The Court, however, did take for granted 
that the President did have constitutional authority to conduct warrantless surveillance for 
foreign intelligence purposes.116 
Next, the Court of Review explored without extending, the Supreme Court’s 
holding in its Keith decision.117 The Supreme Court in Keith adopted the view that a 
more relaxed warrant could suffice in domestic intelligence searches.118 The Court of 
Review noted the Keith Court had avoided the issue of warrantless foreign intelligence 
searches, however, the Court elected not to take the next step and explicitly follow the 
Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Truong and embrace Keith’s unanswered query.119 In that 
the Court had already concluded reversal was required based on the FISA statute itself, 
and in that it had already assumed the President’s inherent authority to conduct 
warrantless foreign intelligence searches, the Court’s decision not to overtly answer 
Keith’s unanswered question was likely more a question of judicial restraint rather than 
substantive deliberation.  
 
Indisputably, FISA exists and the President apparently did not use its warrant 
provisions before or after conducting the NSA surveillance.  However, FISA is an act of 
Congress, not a constitutional article.  The President is vested, by Article II, with an 
inherent authority to conduct war.  The Founders took care in making this delegation 
plenary: 
 
“Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most 
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power 
by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common 
strength; and the power of directing and employing the common strength, 
forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive 
authority.”120 
That Congress through FISA gave the Executive an additional basis upon to 
which exercise its constitutional powers was considerate, but in a time of war such a 
legislative grant is redundant and, in this case, unconstitutionally inimical to the 
separation of powers.121 Analogously, Congress might also pass a law authorizing the 
President to receive ambassadors, or authorizing itself to pass laws relating to interstate 
 
115 Id. at 742. 
116 Id. (adopting the reasoning of U.S. v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).  The Truong 
Court, as did other courts considering the issue, held that the President had inherent authority to conduct 
warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information.  In re: Sealed Case, supra, 310 F.3d at 742.   
117 United States v. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
118 Id. at 322.  The Keith Court recognized the appreciable difference between ordinary crime and crime 
like that in the case before it, which could pose a threat to national security.  Id. 
119 In re: Sealed Case, supra, 310 F.3d at 744. 
120 Alexander Hamilton, FEDERALIST NO. 74. 
121 In times of peace FISA might arguably be a lawful restriction of Presidential power though this article 
does not consider such a contention.  The author notes, however, to the extent national security is an 
ongoing process, the FISA law itself may constitute an unconstitutional restraint of the Executive’s Article 
II powers even in times of peace, insofar as it is applied to foreign and national security intelligence. 
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commerce, naturalization, or bankruptcy.  But such laws are duplicative of inherent 
powers under the Constitution.122 While Congress might legislatively bless certain 
plenary powers of the President, it cannot remove them.123 
Section III: Noseless Victories: The to Legislate or Not to Legislate Quandary  
In the case of the NSA’S surveillance program the Left has finally discovered 
Article I and has decided that they like FISA more than the Constitution.  Thus, they face 
an intellectual and practical dilemma.  They can continue to insist that FISA somehow 
subverts or supplants the explicit and plenary war powers granted by Article II to the 
Executive Branch.  Or the Left can protect decades of jurisprudential wizardry and 
concede to the Executive the Constitution’s explicit endowment.    
 
Continuing to rely upon Article III courts as a venue for preferential policymaking 
carries its own risks, however.  The intrinsic dilemma posed by judicial lawmaking is that 
each case addresses only one policy.  The selective and myopic use of the courts to 
reverse democratic failures can produce unintended consequences and Noseless 
Victories.124 The Left’s obsession with two issues, abortion and capital punishment, 
provides an illustration.125 
Abolition of the death penalty has long been a shibboleth of the Left.126 In 2004 
that objective came closer to reality when the Supreme Court abolished the juvenile death 
penalty in Roper. However, in implementing its litigation strategy the Left arguably 
dynamited the foundations of the right to abortion.  As discussed previously, the right to 
abortion narrowly escaped judicial reversal in Casey, surviving on the slimmest string of 
stare decisis.127 
In Roper as well as in Lawrence, the Supreme Court turned its back on recent 
precedent and impliedly cast away stare decisis as a defining judicial principle.128 
Further, Casey and Roper both made an important doctrinal shift in constitutional 
analysis: each allowed for changes in science and mankind’s knowledge of itself justify 
 
122 U.S. CONST., ART. II, §3 (President shall receive ambassadors….,” U.S. CONST., ART. I, §8 (Congress 
shall have power to…regulate commerce among the states, establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and 
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States). 
123 The process by which Constitutional powers and rights may be amended is solely through the 
Constitutional amendment process set forth in Article V.  U.S. CONST., Art. V. 
124 “Noseless victories” refers to the Japanese proverb of cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face, i.e., a 
form of Pyrrhic victory.   
125 Bork, supra, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH, at 164-65.  Bork identifies both in Britain and the U.S. a 
permanent working alliance between liberals in academia and the media, their counterparts in government 
and its agencies, in private and trade union lobbies, in the courts and law firms, to oppose severe 
punishments, most specifically, capital punishment.  Bork identifies the intersection of radical 
egalitarianism and radical individualism in the abortion issue.  Id. at 183.  
126 Id. 
127 See, discussion of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, supra, Section I. 
128 See discussion, supra, Section I. Roper overruled Stanford v. Kentucky, Lawrence rejected Bowers v. 
Hardwick.
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abandoning precedent and rewriting both the constitutional inquiry and the analysis by 
which it is made.  In Casey, the Court altered its trimester inquiry established in Roe,
replacing it with a more flexible viability standard precisely because medical 
advancements had revealed Roe’s trimester system to be inconsistent with scientific 
fact.129 
Roper too, used science to justify its result.  In determining that evolving 
standards of decency forbade execution of minors under the age of eighteen, the Court 
relied heavily on the science of psychology.  The Court girded its opinion on scientific 
evidence that juveniles’ lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility are 
found in youth more often than in adults and are, thus, more understandable among the 
young.130 In so doing the Court relied heavily on the amicus briefs of the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) and the treatises on juvenile psychology and child 
development cited therein.131 
As discussed briefly in Section I, the APA opined in earlier abortion cases that 
juveniles did posses the requisite maturity to make moral choices about abortion yet 
supplied science to the contrary in Roper. It may very well be that that the science of 
child development and neurology had evolved in the intervening years.132 Nonetheless a 
significant nomological predicament has been posited.  
 
Casey, though upholding Roe, left room for refinements to its central holding 
based on evolving science in maternal health and fetal development.133 This “sliding-
stick” holding left Roe untouched only by yet to be discovered science.  Science in its 
present state, now defines fetal viability as early as 23 weeks in contrast to Roe’s 
formulary of 28 weeks.134 Of course, Casey’s principal foundation was stare decisis, a 
judicial cornerstone ripped conveniently asunder in Roper and Lawrence. The Left, 
hence, must now contemplate the very real possibility that its single-minded quest to 
overturn the death penalty may have laid a jurisprudential basis for Roe’s reversal.   
 
129 See, Casey, supra, 505 U.S. at 860.  Specifically, Justice O’Connor noted,  “We have seen how time has 
overtaken some of Roe's factual assumptions: advances in maternal health care allow for abortions safe to 
the mother later in pregnancy than was true in 1973, see Akron I, supra, at 429, n. 11, and advances in 
neonatal care have advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier. Compare Roe, 410 U. S., at 160, with 
Webster, supra, at 515-516 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.); see Akron I, supra, at 457, and n. 5 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting).” 
130 Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. at 569.  Particularly, the Court identified three broad categories 
which differentiated juveniles from adults and, thus, made juveniles unacceptable for the State’s harshest 
punishment: 1) a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility; 2) juveniles are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure; 3) the 
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.  Id. 
131 Id.  The Court itself cited several psychological texts in its opinion.  Id.  
132 Indeed, the Roper court cited to a recent article in the field- Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of 
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 
Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003).  Id. 
133 Casey, supra, 505 U.S. at 860. 
134 Peggy Peck, “Analysis: Advances redefine fetal viability,” WASHINGTON TIMES, April 7, 2004.  Peck 
reports that while 24-25 weeks is a more general average for viability, even a 23-week fetus will survive. 
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Indeed, the United States Supreme Court had agreed to review the 
constitutionality of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a statute which the Court 
held unconstitutional only six years ago.135 Moreover, the United States’ chief contention 
in that case is that the volume of medical knowledge available now concerning the partial 
birth abortion procedure raises doubts as to the continued vitality of the Court’s 2000 
opinion in Stenberg v. Carhart.136 
The unintended consequences at play between Roper, Lawrence, and Casey 
illustrate the hyper-folly in judicial legislation.  Their interaction also illustrates the 
dilemma the Left faces in confronting the NSA program. Literal adherence to a 
Congressional act the Left in this case prefers (FISA), in opposition to explicit powers 
granted under Article II may erode a decades old and largely successful strategy of using 
the Constitution, implicit or explicit, to accomplish unreachable policy gains. 
 
Conversely, the Left could embrace their newfound love for Article I democracy, 
and maintain that the courts are no longer the place for public policy battles.  This might, 
however,  prove unworkable in the majority of the country where the Left’s secular 
agenda of gay marriage, rights for Guantanamo Bay terrorists, abortion on demand, and 
opposition to the Pledge of Allegiance are unpopular.137 Democracy can be so very 
pedestrian and unaccommodating; nothing like the high octane intelligence required of 
public policy by Constitutional jurisprudence.138 
Or, the Left could admit that it is only some acts of legislation, and some clauses 
of the Constitution, which they prefer.  For example, the 8th Amendment139 or the church-
state wall of separation clause of the 1st Amendment.140 The Second Amendment seems 
 
135 See, “Supreme Court to take up late-term abortion issue,”  USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2006. 
136 See, Pet. Brief, Gonzales v. Carhart, Case No. 05-380, at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2005/2pet/7pet/2005-0380.pet.aa.html . (“Although the [Appeals] court 
conceded that Stenberg did not stand for the proposition that "legislatures are forever constitutionally 
barred from enacting partial-birth abortion bans," it determined that legislatures could enact such bans only 
if, "at some point (either through an advance in knowledge or the development of new techniques, for 
example), the procedures prohibited by the Act will be rendered obsolete."].” 
137 See e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra (captured detainees can challenge basis for confinement in federal 
court), Am. Civil Liberties U., Press release, “ACLU of Colorado Challenges Law Forcing Public School 
Teachers and Students to Recite the Pledge of Allegiance,” Aug. 12, 2003, at 
http://www.aclu.org//religion/schools/16064prs20030812.html, National Organization of Women supports 
same-sex marriage at http://www.now.org/issues/lgbi/marr-rep.html, Am. Civil Liberties U., Press release, 
“Following Passage of Gay Marriage Bans in 11 States, ACLU Vows to Continue Striving for Equality,” 
Nov. 3, 2004, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/relationships/12430prs20041103.html.
138 See generally, Stephen Breyer, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION ( 2005).  Justice Breyer’s theory of “active liberty” sees the Court’s noble role in 
shaping policy as essential in achieving the constitution’s democratic objective.  How this thought is 
reconcilable with the Court’s rewriting legislation and invalidating popularly enacted referenda is both 
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139 See discussion of Roper v. Simmons, supra, Section I. 
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unpreferred.141 Congress’ interstate commerce power? Unpreferred where interstate 
commerce power is used to block Internet taxes, medical marijuana, or federal gun free 
school zones.142 To support federal minimum wage and other labor laws or to authorize 
environmental regulations, Article I Section 8 will suffice nicely.143 Federal immigration 
power will do if it requires the states to keep funding the medical care and education of 
illegal aliens.144 Federal overreaching and bigotry if the immigration power seeks to 
control the borders or regulate drivers’ licenses.145 
Section IV: Conclusion 
Ultimately, picking and choosing when and which clauses of the Constitution 
matter, could become a time consuming process interfering with, for example, the 
impeachment of George Bush or the Lawrence-driven push for same-sex marriage.  As 
demonstrated above, the single minded pursuit of abolishing the death penalty through 
the courts may have sown the seeds of Roe’s reversal.  Continued insistence that FISA 
overrides constitutionally-endowed Executive authority is the type of jurisprudential 
argument likely to cause unintended consequences for later policy debates. 
 
Or perhaps this new love affair is just a tryst, a one night fling to be 
forgotten as soon as its enjoyment (or George W. Bush) is gone? 
 
* M. Dylan McClelland is a Sacramento-based author, litigator and appellate counsel. 
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